OpenVPN server in a Docker container complete with an EasyRSA PKI CA.
Pick a name for the
$OVPN_DATA data volume container. It's recommended to
ovpn-data- prefix to operate seamlessly with the reference systemd
service. Users are encourage to replace
example with a descriptive name of
$OVPN_DATA container that will hold the configuration files
and certificates. The container will prompt for a passphrase to protect the
private key used by the newly generated certificate authority.
docker volume create --name $OVPN_DATA docker run -v $OVPN_DATA:/etc/openvpn --rm kylemanna/openvpn ovpn_genconfig -u udp://VPN.SERVERNAME.COM docker run -v $OVPN_DATA:/etc/openvpn --rm -it kylemanna/openvpn ovpn_initpki
Start OpenVPN server process
docker run -v $OVPN_DATA:/etc/openvpn -d -p 1194:1194/udp --cap-add=NET_ADMIN kylemanna/openvpn
Generate a client certificate without a passphrase
docker run -v $OVPN_DATA:/etc/openvpn --rm -it kylemanna/openvpn easyrsa build-client-full CLIENTNAME nopass
Retrieve the client configuration with embedded certificates
docker run -v $OVPN_DATA:/etc/openvpn --rm kylemanna/openvpn ovpn_getclient CLIENTNAME > CLIENTNAME.ovpn
Miscellaneous write-ups for advanced configurations are available in the docs folder.
systemd init script is available to manage the OpenVPN container. It will
start the container on system boot, restart the container if it exits
unexpectedly, and pull updates from Docker Hub to keep itself up to date.
Please refer to the systemd documentation to learn more.
If you prefer to use
docker-compose please refer to the documentation.
Create an environment variable with the name DEBUG and value of 1 to enable debug output (using "docker -e").
docker run -v $OVPN_DATA:/etc/openvpn -p 1194:1194/udp --cap-add=NET_ADMIN -e DEBUG=1 kylemanna/openvpn
Test using a client that has openvpn installed correctly
$ openvpn --config CLIENTNAME.ovpn
Run through a barrage of debugging checks on the client if things don't just work
$ ping 220.127.116.11 # checks connectivity without touching name resolution $ dig google.com # won't use the search directives in resolv.conf $ nslookup google.com # will use search
Consider setting up a systemd service for automatic start-up at boot time and restart in the event the OpenVPN daemon or Docker crashes.
Initialize the volume container using the
kylemanna/openvpn image with the
included scripts to automatically generate:
The OpenVPN server is started with the default run cmd of
The configuration is located in
/etc/openvpn, and the Dockerfile
declares that directory as a volume. It means that you can start another
container with the
-v argument, and access the configuration.
The volume also holds the PKI keys and certs so that it could be backed up.
To generate a client certificate,
kylemanna/openvpn uses EasyRSA via the
easyrsa command in the container's path. The
variables place the PKI CA under
kylemanna/openvpn comes with a script called
which dumps an inline OpenVPN client configuration file. This single file can
then be given to a client for access to the VPN.
To enable Two Factor Authentication for clients (a.k.a. OTP) see this document.
tun mode, because it works on the widest range of devices.
tap mode, for instance, does not work on Android, except if the device
The topology used is
net30, because it works on the widest range of OS.
p2p, for instance, does not work on Windows.
The UDP server uses
192.168.255.0/24 for dynamic clients by default.
The client profile specifies
redirect-gateway def1, meaning that after
establishing the VPN connection, all traffic will go through the VPN.
This might cause problems if you use local DNS recursors which are not
directly reachable, since you will try to reach them through the VPN
and they might not answer to you. If that happens, use public DNS
resolvers like those of Google (18.104.22.168 and 22.214.171.124) or OpenDNS
(126.96.36.199 and 188.8.131.52).
The Docker container runs its own EasyRSA PKI Certificate Authority. This was
chosen as a good way to compromise on security and convenience. The container
runs under the assumption that the OpenVPN container is running on a secure
host, that is to say that an adversary does not have access to the PKI files
/etc/openvpn/pki. This is a fairly reasonable compromise because if an
adversary had access to these files, the adversary could manipulate the
function of the OpenVPN server itself (sniff packets, create a new PKI CA, MITM
ovpn_copy_server_filesto accomplish this).
build-client-fullcommand will generate and leave keys on the server, again possible to compromise and steal the keys. The keys generated need to be signed by the CA which the user hopefully configured with a passphrase as described above.
This means that it will function correctly (after Docker itself is setup) on all distributions Linux distributions such as: Ubuntu, Arch, Debian, Fedora, etc. Furthermore, an old stable server can run a bleeding edge OpenVPN server without having to install/muck with library dependencies (i.e. run latest OpenVPN with latest OpenSSL on Ubuntu 12.04 LTS).
Everything for the Docker container is contained in two images: the ephemeral
run time image (kylemanna/openvpn) and the
$OVPN_DATA data volume. To remove
it, remove the corresponding containers,
$OVPN_DATA data volume and Docker
image and it's completely removed. This also makes it easier to run multiple
servers since each lives in the bubble of the container (of course multiple IPs
or separate ports are needed to communicate with the world).
At the simplest level compromising the container may prevent additional compromise of the server. There are many arguments surrounding this, but the take away is that it certainly makes it more difficult to break out of the container. People are actively working on Linux containers to make this more of a guarantee in the future.